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Prior to Saturday, June 22, 1985, Joseph Spina would have been
considered a rather successful businessperson. He owned a thriving
resort complex in Port Salerno, Florida, consisting of a hotel, res-
taurant, and boat company. Mr. Spina had purchased the hotel as
part of a compensation agreement for accounting services he had
performed for the hotel's previous owners. After investing over one
million dollars in renovations, he was preparing to sell the property
for approximately four times that amount. The closing was set for
August 3. Only some minor construction work was left to be com-
pleted in order to finalize the deal.
On June 22, however, the United States Marshal Service seized
Mr. Spina's property and ejected him from it. The Marshal told va-
cationing guests, including participants in the Martin County Teach-
ers' Retreat, to pack their bags and leave. To add further insult to
an abruptly terminated holiday, government agents searched the de-
parting guests' vehicles to ensure that the guests did not attempt to
depart with any resort property. As a result of the seizure, the re-
sort's business was severely damaged, and the impending sale
placed in jeopardy.
If Mr. Spina had asked, on June 22, 1985, why the government
was seizing his vacation complex, he would have received a terse
reply. Based on undisclosed information furnished by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, two government attorneys had decided that
they had grounds to "allege[,] upon information and belief ...
[that] the subject real property [was] subject to forfeiture to the
United States of America. ' 2 No further details were provided.
1. These facts are taken from United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located
at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1493-94 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
2. Id. at 1498-99 (complaint reprinted as appendix to court's opinion).
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If Mr. Spina had recently read the United States Constitution, he
might have pressed his questions further. Surely the government
could not be seizing his property based solely on an allegation of
belief by two of its own attorneys. Some judicial officer must have
examined the government's information and independently decided
that there was a sufficient basis to seize the property. 3 Unfortu-
nately, Mr. Spina again would have received a disappointing reply.
As later explained by the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida, the warrant for seizure of his property was
issued without judicial scrutiny. Upon receiving the government's
complaint, "the deputy clerk of the court randomly assigned the case
to the undersigned judge, rubber stamped his name, and affixed the
court's seal to each warrant." 4 Mr. Spina might now be tempted to
breathe a sigh of relief. At least the deputy clerk had weighed the
government's contentions. No one ever said that a judge with life
tenure was the only person capable of determining if a search or
seizure warrant should properly issue.5 Unfortunately, even the
deputy clerk of the district court had not questioned the govern-
ment's allegations; in fact, by law, he was prohibited from doing so. 6
Although judges have decried similar events as "serious and dis-
turbing" 7 and "troubling," 8 it is likely that, under current law, such
scenarios will occur with an ever greater frequency in the future.
3. The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
4. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. at 1494 (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (court clerk without legal
training competent to issue arrest warrants for violations of municipal ordinances). But
see United States v. $128,035.00 in U.S. Currency, 628 F. Supp. 668, 672-73 (S.D. Ohio)
(expressing doubt whether district court clerk is competent to determine whether prob-
able cause exists to seize real property) appeal dismissed mem., 806 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.
1986).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)(b) (1982) (incorporating procedures of Supplemental Rules
for Certain Maritime and Admiralty Claims). Rule C(3) of the Supplemental Rules pro-
vides that:
[i]n actions by the United States for forfeitures for federal statutory violations, the
clerk, upon filing of the complaint, shall forthwith issue a summons and warrant for
the arrest of the vessel or other property without requiring a certification of exigent
circumstances.
28 U.S.C. App. Rule C(3) at 87 (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
7. Application of Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 578 (1st Cir. 1986) (Bownes, J.).
8. Id. at 580 (Torruella,J., dissenting) ("[T]he record establishes a series of ex parte
actions and Catch-22 situations, which are more than vaguely reminiscent of a Star
Chamber proceeding.").
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Despite the plain wording of the fourth amendment,9 the vast ma-
jority of courts view seizures of property pursuant to forfeiture laws
as outside the purview of the warrant requirement, which mandates
judicial authorization prior to government action.' 0 Moreover, civil
forfeiture is on the rise as a preferred law enforcement tool. " The
Department ofJustice encourages government attorneys "to use ag-
gressively the forfeiture weapon in our continuing battle against
crime."1 2 Forfeiture provisions are now incorporated into over 120
federal statutes.' 3 Furthermore, Congress recently extended the
reach of the forfeiture statutes to include "[a]ll real property . . .
intended to be used, in any manner ... to facilitate the commission
of [] a violation" of the narcotics laws.
14
This Current Topic argues that the courts are mistaken in con-
structing a "forfeiture exception" to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment. While seizure of property without a prior adver-
sarial hearing may be necessary to protect important governmental
interests in the continued presence of forfeitable property in the ju-
9. Supra note 3. The fourth amendment applies to forfeiture proceedings since,
although denominated civil, "a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character...
[ilts object, like a criminal proceeding, [being] to penalize for the commission of an
offense against the law." One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700
(1965).
10. See United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Scarbor-
ough v. United States, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz,
711 F.2d 1297, 1302 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 459 (1st Cir. 1980).
11. Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice, has noted that "forfeiture has become one of the primary law
enforcement tools of the 1980's." Asset Forfeiture Office, Criminal Div., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Forfeitures Volume I: Introduction to Civil Statutes v (August 1984) [hereinafter
Fofeitures I]. See also Preface by Brad Cates, Director of the Asset Forfeiture Office in
Asset Forfeiture Office, Criminal Div., U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Asset Forfeiture: Law, Prac-
tice and Policy (1985) (noting that use of civil forfeiture has "mushroomed" since pas-
sage of Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984).
12. Forfeitures 1, supra note 11, at v (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice).
13. Forfeitures I, supra note 11, discusses 126 statutory provisions authorizing prop-
erty forfeitures.
14. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a) (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)).
The term "facilitate" has been given an exceptionally broad construction. "Facilita-
tion" in the similar vehicle forfeiture provision, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1982), has been
"construed to encompass any use or intended use of a vehicle which makes trafficking in
contraband less difficult and laborious." United States v. One 1980 BMW 320i, 559 F.
Supp. 382, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted) (vehicle allegedly used by suspicious
drug dealer for "counter surveillance" held forfeitable). See also United States v. One
1977 Lincoln Mark V. Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The presence of the
automobile with its hood up provided a convenient cover whereas two men alone in an
alley might have appeared suspicious," thus vehicle forfeitable); United States v. One
1981 Datsun 280ZX, 563 F. Supp. 470, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (although no sale ever con-
summated or charges brought, vehicle used to commute to meetings, and in which ne-




risdiction pending trial,' 5 no similar goal is furthered by precluding
ex parte probable cause hearings in all forfeiture cases. 16 Fourth
amendment jurisprudence, and particularly the "exigent circum-
stances" exception to the warrant requirement, adequately protect
the interests of law enforcement authorities in situations where ob-
taining a warrant is impracticable.'
7
Part I of this Current Topic reviews the extent to which the courts
apply constitutional provisions other than the fourth amendment to
the forfeiture context, to underscore the importance of the fourth
amendment issue under consideration. Part II argues that the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement should be applied with
full rigor to the forfeiture context. After advocating that pre-
seizure, ex parte probable cause hearings should be required, the
Current Topic considers various remedies available to persons
whose property has been subjected to an unconstitutional seizure.
I. The Harshness of the Remedy-Lack of Usual
Constitutional Safeguards
Civil forfeiture statutes provide one of the harshest remedies
available to state and federal governments for the punishment of
crime. Although deprivation of life or liberty through the criminal
process involves a more severe sanction, the Constitution provides
defendants in criminal trials with significant protections. In civil for-
feiture cases, however, many of these constitutional safeguards are
absent.
The innocence of the property owner, for example, is no defense
to forfeiture. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,' the
Supreme Court found no constitutional bar to the forfeiture of a
yacht owned by a leasing company, where, thirteen months into the
15. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974)
(state's interest in securing property outweighs owner's due process right to a pre-
seizure adversarial hearing).
16. Even where a forfeiture seizure was involved, the Supreme Court in Pearson Yacht
stressed that a "special need for very prompt action" must exist before adversarial hear-
ings could be dispensed with. 416 U.S. at 678 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
91 (1972)). Thus the Supreme Court has recognized that a blanket forfeiture exception
to the due process clause is not warranted by the government's interest in securing the
property.
17. Although many appellate decisions have approved warrantless seizures without a
showing that obtaining a warrant was impracticable, see supra note 10, one court has
distinguished these cases on the ground that they all involved vehicles, and thus "[tihe
nature of the property involved was, in and of itself.., an exigent circumstance." Dixie
Highway, 612 F. Supp. at 1498.
18. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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lease term, a single marijuana cigarette was found aboard the vessel
while in the possession of a lessee. While holding that the owner's
nonparticipation in the underlying illegal acts was no defense to for-
feiture, the Court did allow that "it would be difficult to reject the
constitutional claim of an owner . . . who proved . . . that he had
done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the pro-
scribed use of his property." 1 9 Although this dictum, by its terms,
creates a defense to forfeiture, it has been construed exceedingly
narrowly by lower courts.20 A federal court has dismissed a forfei-
ture complaint based on the property owner's innocence in only one
reported decision.
21
Furthermore, double jeopardy principles do not apply between
criminal proceedings and forfeiture actions; even a criminal defend-
ant's acquittal will not preclude a later forfeiture claim based on the
same allegedly illegal conduct. 22 Although proof beyond a reason-
able doubt is constitutionally mandated in criminal trials, 23 in civil
forfeiture actions, once the government has met the minimal burden
of showing probable cause to believe a violation of law has oc-
curred,24 the burden shifts to the claimant to absolve the property of
wrongdoing.
25
19. Id. at 689 (footnote and citations omitted).
20. See, e.g., United States v. One Boeing 707 Aircraft, 750 F.2d 1280, 1288-90 (5th
Cir. 1985) (forfeiture affirmed where property owner, although directing agent to notify
lessee that contemplated use of property illegal, failed to contact lessee or regulatory
authorities directly to prevent proscribed use of property). See generally Note, Federal
Civil Forfeiture: An Ill-Conceived Scheme Unfairly Deprives an Innocent Party of its
Property Interest, 62 U. Det. L. Rev. 87, 100-03 (1984); Smith, Prosecution and Defense
of Forfeiture Cases 12.04[3] (1985) (collecting cases).
21. Carpenter v. Andrus, 485 F. Supp. 320, 323 (D. Del. 1980). In two appellate
decisions, courts reversed grants of summary judgment in favor of the government and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the property owner's freedom from
involvement in illegal activity. United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603
(2d Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir.
1977).
22. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984).
23. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
24. "The probable cause which the government must show is: 'a reasonable ground
for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspi-
cion.' " United States v. Banco Cafetero International, 608 F. Supp. 1394, 1404
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citations omitted), affid, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986), (quoting United
States v. $364,960.00 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981)). As distin-
guished from criminal trials, hearsay evidence is also admissible in forfeiture proceed-
ings. United States v. One 1974 Porsche 91 l-S, 682 F.2d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 1982).
25. United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 15-16 (2d Cir.
1982); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO 2-Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th
Cir. 1976) (both cases holding shifting of burden of proof constitutional). See generally
Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceed-




The denial of these constitutional protections in forfeiture actions
is premised on the notion that since civil forfeiture proceeds in rem
(i.e., against the thing), the determinative issue is whether the prop-
erty has been guilty of wrongdoing.2 6 Technically, no penal sanction
is being visited on the property owner; the court is punishing the
property itself for its involvement in unlawful activity. Although the
Supreme Court has expressed doubt as to the usefulness of the in
rem designation in the personal jurisdiction context,27 the treatment
of forfeiture actions as claims in rem seems firmly ensconced in the
law of forfeiture.
28
II. Forfeiture Seizures and the Warrant Requirement
Given the absence of constitutional protections at any later forfei-
ture trial, it is crucial that the government have a reasonable basis
for seizing the property at the time it initiates forfeiture proceed-
ings. Two further considerations also militate in favor of strict judi-
cial application of the fourth amendment. First, the government is
not required to institute judicial proceedings immediately following
the initial seizure. 29 Although the due process clause places some
limitation on the government's ability to delay filing a forfeiture
complaint following seizure,30 even fairly lengthy delays will be jus-
tifiable in most cases due to the pendency of related criminal or ad-
ministrative proceedings. 3 1 As a result, an individual may be
26. See Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 680-86 (reviewing historical understanding that for-
feiture proceeded against the thing); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395,
400 (1878) ("the thing in such cases is primarily considered as the offender, or rather...
the offence is attached primarily to the thing").
27. See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 796 n.3 (1983) (re-
jecting notion "that due process rights may vary depending on whether actions are in
rem or in personam"); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977) (recognizing that "an
adverse judgment in rem directly affects the property owner by divesting him of his rights
in the property before the court").
28. See supra note 26. But see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693, 700 (1965) (exclusionary rule applicable in forfeiture proceeding since action is
"quasicriminal" in character, its object being "to penalize for the commission of an of-
fense against the law"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) ("although the
owner of the goods, sought to be forfeited by a proceeding in rem is not the nominal
party, he is, nevertheless, the substantial party to the suit"). More recently courts have
emphasized that Boyd and Plymouth Sedan "do not obliterate the differences between for-
feitures and criminal sanctions, [and] do not make all incidents of criminal procedure
applicable to forfeiture proceedings." S2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d at 15-16.
29. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982) (customs laws); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (Supp. II
1984) (narcotics laws). Although these statutes direct prosecuting officials to file forfei-
ture complaints within a reasonable time of the initial seizure, they do allow the Depart-
ment ofJustice to exercise considerable discretion.
30. United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1982).
31. See, e.g., id. at 570 (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("a rule that allows the Government to
dispossess a citizen of her property for more than 18 months without her consent and
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deprived of his property for a lengthy period prior to any definitive
determination that the property is in fact subject to forfeiture.
Second, a warrantless seizure can serve as the basis for a subse-
quent warrantless search of the property seized, ostensibly to allow
the government to inventory the impounded items.32 The tradi-
tional justification for such searches has been that "inventory proce-
dures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody
of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property, and to guard the police from danger."33 Despite the nar-
row purpose underlying inventory searches, their permissible scope
is virtually unlimited.
34
The broad warrantless search powers granted to law enforcement
officials under the inventory search doctrine render it essential that
the initial seizure be effected in accordance with the fourth amend-
ment. Otherwise the government can use forfeiture seizures as a
pretext to search for evidence admissible in criminal and civil pro-
ceedings, unfettered by the constraints of the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement. At trial, the court will determine whether
probable cause exists at that time to believe that a violation of law
has occurred. In the absence of pre-seizure probable cause hear-
ings, the distinct issue of whether the government had probable
cause at the time of the seizure will be insulated from critical exami-
nation.3 5 A rule that allows the government to seize now and ex-
without a hearing is a flagrant violation of the Fifth Amendment"); United States v. U.S.
Treasury Bills Totaling $160,916.25 and U.S. Currency Totaling $2,378.75, 750 F.2d
900, 902 (11 th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (14-month delay not unreasonable because of
Government's "diligent pursuit" of pending criminal proceedings); United States v.
Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred and Five Dollars and Ten Cents, 739 F.2d 354, 356
(8th Cir. 1984) (26-month delay justified since property being held as evidence for state
criminal trial). But see United States v. $23,407.69 in U.S. Currency, 715 F.2d 162, 165-
66 (5th Cir. 1983) (6-month delay prior to start of proceedings violative of due process).
32. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
33. Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741 (1987).
34. See, e.g., id. (search of containers found in zippered compartment of backpack
discovered in impounded automobile constitutional); United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d
580, 589 (6th Cir.) (search of tote bag found in impounded automobile constitutional),
cert. denied sub nom. Scarborough v. United States, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984); United States v.
Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 370-71 (3d Cir. 1981) (examination of contents of cardboard box
found in seized car's trunk permissible). But see United States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436,
440 (11 th Cir. 1985) (warrant authorizing seizure of real property does not justify war-
rantless search of home located on the property).
35. Smith, supra note 20, at 10.05[10] (1986) (noting that "a claimant's chance of
getting the property back steadily diminishes as time passes [following the seizure] and
the government has an opportunity to develop probable cause"). But see United States v.
Banco Cafetero Int'l, 608 F. Supp. 1394, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (although no pre-seizure
hearing required, government must show at later forfeiture trial that probable cause




plain later does not adequately protect important fourth
amendment rights.
36
A. Statutorily Authorized Warrantless Seizures
Certain statutory provisions authorize seizure of property based
only on the Attorney General's determination that probable cause
exists to believe that the goods are subject to forfeiture. 37 Some
courts have invalidated warrantless seizures as a matter of constitu-
tional law.38 In United States v. McCormick, for example, the Ninth
Circuit began "with the proposition that the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies equally to searches and to seizures." 39 The court then noted
that "searches [and seizures] conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
36. This Current Topic does not directly address the related issue of whether seizure
without a prior ex parte hearing, or an -immediate post-seizure adversarial hearing,
might violate the due process clause of either the fifth or fourteenth amendments. See,
e.g., United States v. 124 E. North Ave., Lake Forest, Illinois, 651 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill.
1987); United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia Policy No. 002138373, 647 F. Supp. 732
(W.D.N.C. 1986); United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie
Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (all three cases holding forfeiture seizures
without prior judicial authorization violative of the fifth amendment). See also Kandaras,
Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need for Immediate Post-
Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. LJ. 925 (1980). Although the fourth amendment addresses
most directly the process required for seizures of property, the due process clause's
explicit protection of property rights informs the reading of the fourth amendment ad-
vanced in this Current Topic. By reading the two provisions together, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the courts should look not only at the invasion of privacy
interests but also at the infringement of property rights. This joint reading also refutes
the argument that the protection against unreasonable seizures in the fourth amend-
ment is meant to be less strong than the protection against unreasonable searches.
37. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
§ 511 (b)(4), 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (1982).
Although the Contraband Seizure Act, 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1982), does not refer to
either the presence or absence of a valid warrant, it has been interpreted as authoriza-
tion for warrantless seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264, 1267 (10th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 960 (1967); United States v. Troiano, 365 F.2d 416, 419 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966). But see United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 288-89
(9th Cir. 1974) (warrantless seizure of derivative contraband under § 782 invalid, except
in circumstances that independently qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement).
McCormick is discussed infra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text.
See also 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(a) (1982) (any vehicles used to facilitate the importation of
goods contrary to law "shall be seized and forfeited"). Courts have consistently con-
strued this provision as providing authorization for warrantless seizures. See, e.g., United
States v. Pacific Finance Corp., 110 F.2d 732, 733 (2d Cir. 1940) (validating warrantless
seizure under 19 U.S.C.A. § 483 (1935), the precursor to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1982));
United States v. One 1973 Pontiac Grand Am, 413 F. Supp. 163, 165 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
38. United States v. Pruett, 551 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1977); McCormick, 502
F.2d at 288-89.
39. 502 F.2d at 285.
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established and well-delineated exceptions. '"40 The court canvassed
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement and, finding
none of them applicable, held the seizure invalid. Other courts have
held warrantless seizures invalid as a matter of statutory contruc-
tion, while the First Circuit has read one warrantless seizure provi-
sion "as justifying the warrantless seizure of an automobile only
when... the exigencies of the surrounding circumstances make the
requirement of obtaining process unreasonable or unnecessary."-
4'
Yet the majority of courts have found neither constitutional42 nor
statutory43 infirmity in laws authorizing warrantless seizures. The
courts that have approved warrantless forfeiture seizures argue that
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement does not apply
equally to searches and seizures. 44 Thus the Third Circuit observed
a "growing recognition of the distinction, for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis, between searches and seizures." 45 This state-
ment of the law misconstrues both history and precedent.
The desire to protect against arbitrary governmental seizures of
property has deep roots in the common law tradition. One of the
earliest precedents for the American Bill of Rights is Article 39 of
Magna Charta, which sought to prevent KingJohn from imprisoning
his subjects and seizing their property as punishment without re-
gard to the constraints of legal procedure or the requirement of a
judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction. 46 In the colonies,
one of the specific evils the fourth amendment was intended to rem-
edy was the use of general warrants and writs of assistance. 47 These
warrants provided the bearer with a general license to search any
premises and seize contraband or any goods found to be evidence of
40. Id. at 285 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)).
41. United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 330 (1st Cir. 1980) (en banc) (interpret-
ing 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (1982)).
42. See supra note 10.
43. United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1982) (rejecting Pappas'
strained construction of 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (1982)).
44. See, e.g., United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d
1297, 1302 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 369 (3d Cir. 1981).
45. Bush, 647 F.2d at 369.
46. N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 20 (1937) [hereinafter Lasson]. Royal courts created the ac-
tion of replevin to place legal constraints on the lord's similar practice of seizing a sub-
ject's property for the enforcement of services due. S.F.C. Milsom, Historical
Foundations of the Common Law 104-05 (2d ed. 1981).
47. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 n.21 (1980) (noting that John
Adams credited the denunciation of writs of assistance in Boston in 1761 as "the first act




crime. 48  One of the primary uses of the writ of assistance was to
facilitate forfeiture seizures, primarily for violations of the customs
laws .49
The broad seizure powers exercised by representatives of the
Crown "excited the indignation of the people.- 50 On several occa-
sions, colonists confronted by government officials bearing writs of
assistance countered with armed resistance. In one case, towns-
people in Falmouth forcibly recaptured goods that had been seized
under a writ of assistance. 5' In another incident, in Boston in 1766,
one Captain Daniel Malcolm held off government officers seeking to
seize wine on which duties had not been paid by brandishing two
48. In England, general warrants were used by the infamous Court of Star Chamber
to detect and punish seditious libels. Lasson, supra note 46, at 24-26. The issuance and
use of such general warrants to punish journalists were disapproved by the judiciary.
Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 291-92 (C.P. 1765) ("strong reason to believe" partic-
ular goods forfeitable must be shown by sworn testimony prior to seizure of property);
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205 (C.P. 1763). Writs of assistance were also used by Charles
I as a means for seizing goods to enforce payment of the unpopular duty of "tonnage
and poundage." Lasson, supra note 46, at 30.
49. Two of the most important cases challenging these seizures were Province of
Massachusetts Bay v. Paxton, Quincy's (Mass.) Reports 548 (Super. Ct. 1761), and Er-
ving v. Cradock, Quincy's (Mass.) Reports 553 (Super. Ct. 1761). A writ of assistance
issued by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court authorized Charles Paxton and his
agents,
to enter & go into any House Shop Cellar Warehouse or Room or other place and
in case of resistance to break open doors chests trunks & other package there to
seize and from thence to bring any kinds of goods or merchandize whatsoever pro-
hibited or uncustomed.
Reprinted in Quincy's (Mass.) Reports at 419. In his argument against the use of such
general writs, James Otis asserted that:
an Act against the Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity is void: and if
an Act of Parliament should be made, in the very Words of this [writ], it should be
void.
Id. at 469 (quoting John Adams' contemporaneous notes of Otis' argument). The
Supreme Court has recognized that Otis' argument in these cases represents one of the
most significant events in American colonial history. See supra note 47. In both cases,
jurors of locals held the seizures under general warrants illegal. The Superior Court,
whose members were appointed directly by the Crown, reversed both judgments. See
also Lasson, supra note 46, at 63-64 n.48.
50. Id. at 63 n.48.
51. Id. at 68-69. In response to a similar recovery of goods by colonists in Newbury,
Massachusetts in 1766, the Governor of Massachusetts cautioned overzealous customs
officers that the people would not suffer continued warrantless seizures:
Upon this occasion People do not wonder at the goods being rescued, but at an
Officer's being so hardy & foolish as to seize them and think he would be able to
retain them. Under the present dominion of the People I have never expected that
any goods, tho' ever so notoriously forfeited, would be seized, or secured or prose-
cuted; an attempt of that kind being judged impracticable in every step by some of
the most diligent & discrete Custom house officers.
Letter from Governor Pownall to the Lords of Trade (March 17, 1766), quoted in
Quincy's (Mass.) Reports at 445.
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swords and a pistol.5 2 When John Hancock's sloop was seized in
1768 for its owner's failure to pay import duties on wine, a riot
ensued.
53
The colonists' main objection was that the courts were authoriz-
ing these property seizures "without an investigation of the mer-
its."5 The widespread popular resistance to these essentially
warrantless seizures was soon reflected in judicial opinions. Faced
with explicit statutory authorization for general warrants, the Supe-
rior Court of Connecticut resorted to the then-fledgling concept of
"unconstitutionality" to hold the practice void. 55
Several of the newly independent states guarded against such
deprivations of property by including explicit prohibitions against
warrantless seizures in their Declarations of Rights. 56 Similarly,
when the federal Constitution was presented to the states for ratifi-
cation, members of the Virginia convention criticized the absence of
a Bill of Rights. Patrick Henry, one of the most outspoken oppo-
nents of the Constitution, referred to the possibility that, once
again, government officers would be able to seize a citizen's prop-
erty on any pretext whatsoever. 57 In response to these strenuous
objections, a committee of delegates drafted a list of recommended
amendments. Article XIV of these proposals stated emphatically
that "all warrants ... to . . . seize any freeman, his papers, or prop-
erty, without information on oath . .. of legal and sufficient cause,
are grievous and oppressive."-
5 8
The call for amendment to the Constitution did not abate follow-
ing its ratification. James Madison, who had previously argued that
no Bill of Rights was necessary, proposed a set of amendments
shortly after George Washington's inauguration. Defending what
was later to become the fourth amendment on the floor of Con-
gress, Madison referred to the danger that, in the absence of such a
52. Lasson, supra note 46, at 68-69.
53. Id. at 72.
54. Letter from Judge William Henry Drayton of South Carolina to the First Conti-
nental Congress (Aug. 10, 1774), quoted in Lasson, supra note 46, at 75.
55. Id. at 73 (describing an opinion by Chief Justice Trumbull in Mar. 1768).
56. Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire passed
declarations containing the most strongly worded protections against warrantless prop-
erty seizures. See id. at 81-82.
57. 3 Debates on the Federal Constitution 588 (J. Elliot ed. 1888) ("any man may be
seized, any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence
or reason").





provision, government might again resort to the issuance of general
warrants to enforce the collection of revenues.
59
The history of the fourth amendment's adoption clearly indicates
the Framers' concern that overzealous officials would seize property
indiscriminately under the authority of forfeiture laws. The warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment was intended to curb govern-
ment abuses of power in the form of seizures of property as well as
searches of dwellings. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the courts
that have recognized a distinction between searches and seizures
have erroneously relied on Supreme Court cases upholding war-
rantless arrests. 60 While the Supreme Court has suggested that
"arrest of a person is quintessentially a seizure," 6' the history can-
vassed by the Court in the warrantless arrest cases has no real rele-
vance to the distinct question of the propriety of warrantless property
seizures. On the contrary, as Justice Lewis Powell has noted, the
Framers were less concerned with warrantless seizures of persons
than of property:
There is no historical evidence that the framers or proponents of the
Fourth Amendment, outspokenly opposed to the infamous general warrants
and writs of assistance, were at all concerned about warrantless arrests by
local constables and other peace officers. 62
Courts upholding warrantless forfeiture seizures also suggest that
a "forfeiture exception" to the warrant requirement has been ac-
cepted for many years. 63 On examination, however, the cases cited
as evidence of this "historical acceptance" do not support such a
broad assertion. In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,64 for example,
the question before the Court was whether the property owner's
complicity in the underlying illegal acts was an element of the gov-
ernment's case of forfeiture. In the process of stating the facts, the
Court noted that the seizure had been effected without judicial au-
thorization. 65 The Court did not discuss the point in detail, how-
59. Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 456 (June 8, 1789), quoted in Lasson,
supra note 46, at 99.
60. United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d 1297, 1302 (5th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 370 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976)).
61. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting W1atson, 423 U.S. at 428
(Powell, J. concurring)).
62. 423 U.S. at 429 (1976) (Powell, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
63. Bush, 647 F.2d at 369; United States v. One Pontiac 1975 LeMans, 621 F.2d 444,
450 (1st Cir. 1980).
64. 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
65. Id. at 396.
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ever, nor did it hold that this mode of process was consonant with
the fourth amendment.
Boyd v. United States66 involved the compulsory production of in-
criminating documents for the prosecution's use in a forfeiture pro-
ceeding. In dicta, the Court stated that seizure of items of
contraband per se (articles whose mere possession is a violation of
the law) and goods on which duties had not been paid was beyond
the scope of the fourth amendment.67 The government's right to
seize items of contraband per se without a warrant is indisputable.
68
As to dutiable articles, the Court discussed only inspections at the
border, or other points at which imported goods enter the country.
Again, compulsory inspection and seizure of goods in this context is
hardly objectionable. The question of prime importance, however,
is what standard should be applied to the seizure of derivative contra-
band-those items whose particular use renders them forfeitable.
These items are, by definition, not overtly illegal. Instead, their for-
feitability is established only following development of the facts rel-
ative to their use in a judicial proceeding. Boyd's broad dicta are not
relevant to this issue.
In United States v. Francolino,69 another case cited as evidence of the
"historical acceptance" of warrantless seizures, Judge Henry
Friendly relied primarily on Boyd and Carroll v. United States 70 to up-
hold such a seizure. The Supreme Court had stated in Carroll that
warrantless automobile searches are permissible "where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought." 7' Although this passage rests the constitutionality of a
warrantless search or seizure on the practicability of obtaining a
warrant, Judge Friendly interpreted it as only explaining the basis for
the automobile forfeiture exception, and not as requiring a judicial
examination of the practicability issue.72 In so holding, he was influ-
enced by United States v. 'Rabinowitz,73 which held that courts must
not ask whether a warrant could have been obtained, but only
whether the search was reasonable under all of the circumstances.
66. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
67. Id. at 623-24.
68. Examples of such items include narcotics, stolen property, and unlicensed liquor
or firearms.
69. 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967).
70. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
71. Id. at 153.
72. 367 F.2d at 1020.




Rabinowitz, however, was subsequently overruled. 74 Thus, Judge
Friendly's holding that warrantless forfeiture seizures are valid
whether or not obtaining a warrant is practicable is suspect.
75
Although neither history nor precedent support a blanket exemp-
tion from the warrant requirement for forfeiture seizures, situations
may arise in which obtaining a warrant would seriously hamper law
enforcement activities. The Supreme Court's application of the due
process clause to forfeiture seizures provides a useful guide to
courts seeking to balance the conflicting interests of government
and the individual. In general, the Court has held that an opportu-
nity to be heard is required by the due process clause before prop-
erty may be attached in civil litigation.76 The Court has recognized,
however, that in some cases the government might need to seize
property without delay to protect the public interest. Because of the
important individual rights at stake, the Court has not allowed this
governmental interest to create an exception to the hearing require-
ment in all cases of governmental property seizure; instead, the
Court has carefully circumscribed the situations in which a hearing
could be dispensed with:
[First,] the seizure [must be] directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest. Second, there [must be] a
special need for very prompt action. Third, the State [must keep]
strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiat-
ing the seizure [must be] a government official responsible for deter-
mining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it [is]
necessary and justified in the particular instance. 7
7
In upholding a forfeiture seizure conducted without a prior hearing
in Pearson Yacht, the Court was careful to note the concurrence of all
three factors, and in particular the necessity of prompt action to se-
cure the property.78 Lower courts have recognized that the
Supreme Court did not create a complete exemption from hearing
74. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
75. See United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1974) (distin-
guishing Francolino on this ground).
76. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating Florida and Pennsylvania
replevin statutes that allowed creditor to seize debtor's property based on mere asser-
tion that creditor entitled to the property); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969) (holding unconstitutional Wisconsin statute allowing creditor's attorney to
freeze debtor's wages prior to hearing).
77. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
78. 416 U.S. at 679 ("preseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests
served by the statutes, since the property seized-as here, a yacht-will often be of a sort
that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warn-
ing of confiscation were given."). See also United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461
U.S. 555, 562 n.12 (1983) (preseizure adversarial hearing not required where
"preseizure notice might frustrate the statutory purpose").
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requirements for forfeiture seizures, and have invalidated seizures
where exigent circumstances did not exist.
79
A similar approach is warranted under the fourth amendment.
Acknowledging that situations may exist in which government of-
ficers cannot obtain a warrant does not require exempting govern-
ment agents from the warrant requirement in all cases. The
forfeiture exception to the warrant requirement should be seen for
what it is: only a particular application of the well-recognized exi-
gent circumstances exception. To allow warrantless seizures gener-
ally is to ratify a practice that the Framers of the fourth amendment
specifically intended to prevent: the taking of property based only
on the unsubstantiated suspicions of law enforcement authorities.
Especially where a serious and long-term deprivation of property
may ensue, a check on the government's seizure power is both man-
dated by the Constitution and consistent with sound policy.
80
B. Summary Warrant Procedure Authorized by the Admiralty Rules
Several forfeiture statutes adopt the rules of admiralty procedure
as a model for forfeiture proceedings. 8' Rule C(3) of the Supple-
mental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, which re-
quires judicial authorization for a seizure warrant in the majority of
in rem actions, specifically exempts forfeiture proceedings brought
by the federal government from the requirement ofjudicial scrutiny.
79. United States v. 124 E. North Ave., Lake Forest, Illinois, 651 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D.
Ill. 1987); United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia Policy No. 002138373, 647 F. Supp.
732 (W.D.N.C. 1986); United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 4880
S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985). But see United States v. A Single
Family Residence and Real Property Located at 900 Rio Vista Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, 803
F.2d 625, 632 (11 th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that Pearson Yacht created a blanket forfeiture
exception to due process requirement of pre-seizure probable cause hearing).
The Advisory Committee that proposed Rule C(3) of the Admiralty Rules failed to
appreciate that the Supreme Court had not exempted all forfeiture cases from the re-
quirements of the due process clause. Although Rule C(3) provides for prior hearing in
private admiralty cases, the rule contains a blanket exception for forfeiture suits brought
by the United States. See supra note 6 (quoting rule). In justification, the Committee
merely stated that "[i]n such actions a prompt hearing is not constitutionally required."
28 U.S.C. App. Rule C(3) at 87 (Supp. III 1985) (citing Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. 663
(1974)). The Committee obviously misread the Supreme Court's opinion in Pearson
Yacht, which specifically noted that it was only where exigent circumstances existed that
an exemption from preseizure hearing could be granted. The Advisory Committee also
completely disregarded any possible fourth amendment problem. See infra note 83.
80. See Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. at 1497 (arguing that the government's conflict-
ing functions of authorizing, effecting, and defending seizures mandate procedural safe-
guards in the form of pre-seizure judicial review).
81. See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,





Once the government has filed its verified complaint of forfeiture,
the clerk must "forthwith" issue a summons and seizure warrant.
82
Although the warrant issuance procedure authorized by Rule C(3)
might seem less objectionable than the warrantless seizures author-
ized by other statutes, it suffers from the same constitutional flaws.
83
By requiring the issuance of a warrant without a determination of
probable cause, the rule runs afoul of the fourth amendment. The
fourth amendment requires that a warrant application be reviewed
by a "neutral and detached magistrate," who is "capable of deter-
mining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or
search." 84 Although a federal district court clerk might meet the
requirement of neutrality and detachment,8 5 under the mandatory
wording of Rule C(3), it is doubtful whether the clerk would be ca-
pable of making an independent determination of whether probable
cause exists. 86 Since the warrant is merely a piece of paper com-
pleted by the clerk as a ministerial task, it does not satisfy the fourth
amendment any more completely than does a warrantless seizure.
The six district courts that have recently considered the constitu-
tionality of Rule C(3) have concluded unanimously that it fails on
fourth amendment grounds.8 7 Unfortunately, most of these courts
have explicitly limited their holdings to the seizure of real prop-
82. See supra note 6.
83. Of course, the Supreme Court has emphasized that any rule adopted in accord-
ance with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), bears a strong presumption
of constitutionality. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (court should invalidate
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Con-
gress erred in their prima faciejudgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither
the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions"). See also Burlington
Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, 107 S.Ct. 967, 970 n.3 (1987) (Hanna's analysis ex-
tended to all rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act). But the Amendment to
Rule C(3), which added the forfeiture exception, was not examined in terms of any pos-
sible fourth amendment infirmity. See 28 U.S.C. App. at 87 (Supp. III 1985) (text of
Advisory Committee Note). Under these circumstances, the presumption of validity to
be accorded to the Federal Rules of Procedure should not preclude a finding of
unconstitutionality.
84. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972). See also Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 n.l I (1979) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 835 (1978)).
85. See supra note 5.
86. United States v. Three Parcels of Property Known as 237 Cheshire Road, Civ.
No. N-85-334 (EBB), slip op. at 5 (D. Conn. Sept. 9, 1986) (holding Rule C(3) unconsti-
tutional since "[o]nce the complaint is filed, the Clerk's role is entirely ministerial").
87. See Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 647 F. Supp. at 742; United States v. $128,035.00 In
U.S. Currency, 628 F. Supp. 668, 673 (S.D. Ohio) appeal dismissed mem., 806 F.2d 262 (6th
Cir. 1986); Application of Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219, 223 (D. Mass. 1985), mandamus
denied, appeal dismissed as moot, 802 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1986); 237 Cheshire Road, Civ. No.
N-85-334 (EBB), slip op. at 5 (all four cases holding rule unconstitutional under fourth
amendment); Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. at 1497; 124 E. North Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350
(both cases holding rule unconstitutional under due process clause). But see United
States v. Articles of Hazardous Substance, 588 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1978) (upholding
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erty,88 where the government's claim that prompt action is neces-
sary to secure the property is weakest. 89 Until the Supreme Court
rules squarely on the constitutionality of Rule C(3), the government
will continue to seize property under Rule C(3) warrants in those
districts in which no court has yet addressed the issue.
III. Remedies for Unconstitutional Seizures
The constitutional difficulties with warrantless seizures would be
greatly ameliorated if Congress amended the myriad statutes and
rules that authorize this practice. Barring a legislative solution,
however, the most appropriate protection of fourth amendment
rights would be a judicially enforced requirement that all seizures
that do not qualify for a recognized exception to the warrant re-
quirement be conducted only after ex parte review by a neutral and
detached magistrate. Under present law, however, unconstitutional
seizures are likely to occur with some frequency. It is therefore nec-
essary to consider what the appropriate remedies for such seizures
should be.
A. Application of the Exclusionary Rule, Dismissal of the Forfeiture
Complaint, and Other Procedural Remedies
If the courts were to rule that the forfeitable article is itself im-
mune from involvement in the forfeiture proceeding through appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule (which renders evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment inadmissible at trial), no further
suit would be possible. Seizure of the property is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to the maintenance of a forfeiture action, since the
property is the defendant named in the forfeiture complaint.9 0 The
Supreme Court has apparently retreated from such an expansive ap-
seizure pursuant to Rule C(3) warrant of goods determined to be toxic under Federal
Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1982)).
88. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. at 1496, 1498; 237 Cheshire Road, Civ. No. N-85-334
(EBB), slip op. at 5; $128,035.00 in U.S. Currency, 628 F. Supp. at 673; 124 E. North Ave,
651 F. Supp. 1350.
89. Real property cannot be removed from the jurisdiction, and conveyance to an
innocent third party can be prevented by filing a notice of lis pendens on the deed.
$128,035.00 In US. Currency, 628 F.Supp. at 674 n.4; 237 Cheshire Road, Civ. No. N-85-
334 (EBB), slip op. at 8 n.4; 124 E. North Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350.
90. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). At least one commentator has sug-
gested that "[a] rule that immunizes from forfeiture illegally seized derivative contra-
band comports with the underlying purposes of the exclusionary rule." Recent
Developments, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Illegal Seizure of Derivative
Contraband Bars Forfeiture, 60 Wash. U.L.Q 724, 731 (1982) (footnote omitted). See





plication of the exclusionary rule, however, stating that "[t]he 'body'
or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil pro-
ceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful
arrest." 9 1
Even if the court is precluded from suppressing the article seized
in the forfeiture trial, the government's forfeiture complaint should
still be dismissed where it fails to allege facts sufficient to assure a
judicial officer that probable cause existed for the seizure. 9
2
Although such a dismissal might seem a rather formal victory for the
property's owner, it would at least ensure that the government pos-
sessed facts sufficient to meet its burden of showing probable cause
independently of its possession of the forfeitable article. 93 The
court should also consider returning the property to its owner pend-
ing its disposition in the forfeiture trial, and shifting the burden of
proof to the government on the issue of the owner's freedom from
involvement in the underlying illegal activity. 94
91. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039
(1984). The Court made it clear that this principle applied to forfeiture actions, stating
that "[a] similar rule applies in forfeiture proceedings directed against contraband or
forfeitable property." 1d. at 1040. The Court's dictum has been read to preclude auto-
matic dismissal of the government's forfeiture complaint where an unconstitutional
seizure has occurred. Application of Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 578-79, and n.9 (1st Cir.
1986); United States v. Three Parcels Known as 237 Cheshire Road, Civ. No. N-85-334
(EBB), slip op. at 4 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 1986).
92. In three of the cases that have found seizures under Rule C(3) unconstitutional,
the courts have formally quashed the seizure warrant only to immediately reissue it
based on an independent determination that the verified complaint of forfeiture alleges
facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. See $128,035.00 In U.S. Currency,
628 F.Supp. at 675; 237 Cheshire Road, Civ. No. N-85-334 (EBB), slip op. at 5 and n.5 (D.
Conn. Sept. 9, 1986); 124 E. North Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350. In Dixie Highiway, however,
the court found the complaint wholly insufficient to support the property seizure, and
therefore dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. 612 F. Supp. at 1498. See also
Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 647 F. Supp. at 742 (ordering return of property to owner since
government's complaint alleged forfeitability in conclusory terms).
93. Any evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless seizure, or any subsequent
search, would be suppressed as "fruits of the poisonous tree." See generally 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 11.4(f) (1978 & 1985 supp.). But see Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.Ct.
1160, 1167 (1987) ("good faith" exception to exclusionary rule extended to situation
where officers act in "objectively reasonable reliance" on a statute authorizing warrant-
less searches later found to be unconstitutional).
94. A comparison might be drawn between shifting the burden of proof on the issue
of the owner's fault as a "constitutional sanction" based on a fourth amendment viola-
tion and the sweeping sanctions available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to comply with discovery orders. Rule 37(b)(2) provides that the court may dis-
miss the action, preclude a party from contesting any issue, or make any other order that
is just for failure to comply with a discovery order. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (defendant's minimum con-
tacts with the forum taken as established due to defendant's failure to comply with dis-
covery order); Nat'l Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam) (dismissal of action for failure to respond in timely fashion to writ-
ten interrogatories).
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B. Award of Attorneys' Fees to Litigants Prevailing on the Fourth
Amendment Issue
Where the claimant to the property wins an outright dismissal of
the forfeiture suit by raising a fourth amendment challenge, he or
she is clearly entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. The Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act (EAJA) provides that "a court shall award to a
prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justi-
fied." 95 The claimant who wins a dismissal is clearly a prevailing
party, and the termination of the action is predicated upon a finding
that the government seized the property without sufficient evidence,
i.e., substantial justification.
96
A more complicated question is presented when the court,
although holding a warrantless seizure unconstitutional, makes an
independent determination that probable cause exists based on the
allegations in the complaint and allows the forfeiture action to pro-
ceed.97 The Supreme Court has held that mere procedural victories
unrelated to the merits of an action do not render a litigant a "pre-
vailing party" for the purposes of EAJA.98 A number of courts have
recognized, however, that fees should be allowed where a party is
victorious on an issue that is "sufficiently significant and discrete to
be treated as a separate unit." 99 Courts have also held that a dismis-
sal without prejudice to the refiling of the complaint renders the
defendant a prevailing party.' 00 Under these precedents, a claimant
who successfully challenges a warrantless seizure but does not
achieve a dismissal of the action should be considered a prevailing
party. Although the government may reinstitute the action once the
95. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West. Supp. 1987). Congress clearly intended
EAJA to provide a deterrent to unlawful government conduct of the sort involved here.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 4984, 4988 (without award of attorney's fees to private litigants, "the
Government with its greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce compliance
with its position").
96. See Dixie Highway, 628 F. Supp. 1467 (awarding attorney's fees to claimant based
on earlier determination that forfeiture seizure pursuant to Rule C(3) unconstitutional).
97. A reissuance of the seizure warrant by the court has in fact been the most com-
mon outcome where courts have held Rule C(3) unconstitutional. See supra note 92.
98. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (per curiam).
99. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra note 95, at 11 (quoting Van Hoomissen v. Xerox
Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974) (successful challenge to Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's motion to intervene in private discrimination suit appropri-
ate basis for award of fees)).
100. Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No.1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 771 F.2d 521, 525
(D.C.Cir. 1985) (dismissal for improper venue); Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcasting




court examines the factual allegations in the complaint, the claimant
has won an "enduring victory"'' ° that insures that his fourth
amendment rights will not be violated again. In addition to reim-
bursing the claimant for costs incurred, an award of attorneys' fees
serves the salutary purpose of deterring future governmental
misconduct.
C. Private Right of Action for Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights
The most effective remedy for an unconstitutional seizure is prob-
ably a civil damages action, in which an injured property owner
could recover against the government officials effecting the seizure.
Although the United States government is not liable for this kind of
injury,'0 2 the Supreme Court has recognized private rights of action
for constitutional violations directly against the offending
officials. 103
While recognizing personal liability for unconstitutional conduct,
the Court has been sensitive to the possibility that such liability
might deter conscientious law enforcement. In order not to deter
police officials from aggressively performing their duty, the
Supreme Court has clothed the activities of law enforcement offi-
cials in a qualified immunity from suit. 10 4 To avoid dismissal of his
damages action under the qualified immunity doctrine, the plain-
tiff10 5 must show that the challenged conduct "violate[d] clearly es-
tablished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." 10 6
The Court has not defined with specificity the level of recognition
necessary to render a right "clearly established."'' 0 7 Lower courts
have held that a controlling opinion of the circuit or even district
101. 771 F.2d at 525.
102. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that "[t]he United States shall be liable,
respecting .. . tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). The constitutional re-
straints of the fourth amendment do not apply to private parties. Since no parallel pri-
vate duty exists, the Federal Tort Claims Act does not authorize a claim against the
government. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950).
103. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying private right of action from fourth amendment guarantee
of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures).
104. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
105. Although the government official, as defendant, must plead his or her claimed
immunity as a matter of affirmative defense, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980),
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the action complained of violated a clearly
established right. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984).
106. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
107. Id. at 818 n.32.
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court within whose jurisdiction the challenged conduct occurred
may make a right "clearly established" for the purposes of that geo-
graphical area,' 0 8 and the trend has been toward requiring govern-
ment officials to recognize and anticipate legal developments that
do not represent a radical departure from past precedent. 0 9
A government official cannot escape liability by simply relying on
a statute that authorizes warrantless seizures, or a rule that results in
the automatic issuance of a warrant. In Malley v. Briggs,"t0 the
Supreme Court held that formal compliance with the requirement
of review of a warrant application by a neutral magistrate does not
immunize a law enforcement officer from a private damages action.
The Court stated that "[d]efendants will not be immune if, on an
objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer
would have concluded that a warrant should issue.""' Although
Malley involved the factual sufficiency of the warrant application, the
question of the constitutional sufficiency of warrant procedures
should also be susceptible to the "reasonably competent officer"
standard without subjecting policemen to a chilling liability. As the
fourth amendment rights of property owners become more clearly
established," 2 an action for damages may well be an appropriate
remedy in most cases.
108. See, e.g., James v. Price, 602 F. Supp. 843, 846 (D.NJ. 1985) (due process
clause's protection against malicious prosecution clearly established in District of New
Jersey since single district court opinion so holding had not been overruled or ques-
tioned); Hixon v. Durbin, 560 F. Supp. 654, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (en banc opinion of
Third Circuit to be given broad reading in order to determine whether right clearly
established).
109. People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144
(3d Cir. 1984) (refusing to require strict factual similarity between precedent and case at
hand in order to hold a right clearly established; "demanding that officials apply gen-
eral, well developed legal principles"). See also Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The
Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section
1983, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, 927-30 (1984) (collecting cases; advocating approach that
requires law enforcement officials to anticipate reasonably forseeable legal develop-
ments).
Where an issue is unsettled, as indicated by conflicting holdings or an appellate
court's explicit reservation of the question, no damages action will lie. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (where a right only recognized by judiciary after chal-
lenged conduct has occurred, qualified immunity bars suit); Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d
1543, 1549-50 (11 th Cir. 1985); Schlothauer v. Robinson, 757 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam); Washington v. Starke, 626 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (W.D. Mich. 1986); Fann v.
City of Cleveland, 616 F. Supp. 305, 314 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
110. 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1098 (1986).
111. Id. at 1096.






It did not take long for Joseph Spina to recover from the unhappy
series of events that began with the seizure of his resort on June 22,
1985. Mr. Spina filed an emergency motion for retention of the
property on June 25. On July 3, 1985, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida held that the seizure of
Mr. Spina's resort complex was unconstitutional. Finding that the
forfeiture complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to
support a finding of probable cause, the court dismissed the com-
plaint and ordered the property returned to its owner."13 In a sub-
sequent opinion the court awarded attorneys' fees to Mr. Spina
under the Equal Access to Justice Act. In so doing the court re-
jected the United States' argument that adherence to the Supple-
mental Rules for Certain Maritime and Admiralty Claims necessarily
supplied substantial justification for the seizure.' 
4
Unfortunately, Mr. Spina's vindication will not prevent the gov-
ernment from conducting similar seizures in the future. Congress
or the courts must act to curb overzealous law enforcement officials.
The unambiguous wording of the fourth amendment, the history of
its adoption, and the judiciary's consistent interpretation of the
amendment in other contexts all clearly mandate that the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement be applied to forfeiture seizures.
Congress and the courts also should provide the victims of unconsti-
tutional seizures with remedies both within and beyond the confines
of the forfeiture action itself, such as those mentioned in Part III of
this Current Topic. Only in this fashion will the provisions of the
Constitution serve as a meaningful restraint on drastic government
action.
113. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492.
114. Dixie Highway II, 628 F. Supp. 1467.
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